

26 May 1978

NOTE FOR: John 
FROM: Arline
SUBJECT: Lehman Request for I&W Action in HPSCI Markup

The Committee expressed its concern over the absence of a point of accountability for warning, recommended the establishment of a full-time position to deal with the subject and asked that by 1 August the DCI report on what actions he has taken to establish a clear focus of responsibility for warning.

Lehman is chairing a joint NFAC-CTS working group on the subject (Fred Harrison is the CTS rep) so Dick is the logical person to provide the information at least until his working group designates another individual or staff (possibly) to be responsible for I&W. STATT

It seems prudent to tell Lehman that he can consider the action to draft a reply to the House is his until and if his working group designates a crisis coordinator.

In that event allowing the new element to reply to Congress will give it the opportunity to get Turner's approval for its charter.

We should make two things clear to Lehman:

- Until the conference ratifies these studies, they are tentative--although this one will surely be among the final list.
- You are in a position to give him the action for the study only not to recommend to the DCI who the focal point for I&W should be.

I recommend you do all this over the telephone since nothing is firm, however, I will be glad to try to draft an appropriately vague note if you prefer.

Attached are the pertinent pages from the HPSCI markup.

*yes. Please do.
JL*

TOP SECRET

19

commonality and interoperability is required. Although no specific adjustments to the Fiscal Year 1979 request are recommended, a more detailed justification for continued development of these systems should be provided in Fiscal Year 1980.

(f) The Committee finds that effective warning at the national level requires drawing on the full resources of the Intelligence Community to produce its best judgment on a situation that may require decision. That judgment must be presented in a sufficiently authoritative form to be heard clearly, without suppressing views into a bland consensus. The Committee has encountered concern -- particularly in those elements of the Intelligence Community involved in indications and warning -- over the absence of a point of accountability for warning. The Committee considers these concerns well founded. The DCI must establish a clearer focus for warning. It is recommended this be accomplished by creating a full-time position with the following responsibilities:

(1) Provide the DCI with the judgments of all the Intelligence Community's organizations on a situation that any one of them judges to be serious enough to receive the attention of top decision makers.

(2) Ensure timely formation of interagency working groups to monitor emerging situations and form interagency crisis management groups as necessary;

(3) Oversee the Strategic Warning Staff and enable it to play a less detached role.

25X1

TOP SECRET

(4) Promote essential exchange of information between intelligence and operations or policy elements, and manage the selection and adoption of interagency conferencing systems and alerting procedures.

The Committee recognizes that the necessary focus for warning cannot be achieved entirely by organizational means; equally important is the attitude displayed toward warning by intelligence management and analysts as well as by the user.

Certain of the proposed functions outlined are now performed, but on an informal or ad hoc basis. The Committee asks that the DCI establish a clear focus of responsibility for warning and report to this Committee by August 1, 1978 on what actions have been taken.

(h) The Committee notes with concern the disparity between CIA and other intelligence activities as relates to the distribution of supergrade positions. It appears, however, that the major issue is not necessarily the number and mix of supergrades at the CIA, but rather a determination of the appropriate number and mix across the entire National Foreign Intelligence Program. In order to resolve this question, the Committee will conduct a review of the current authorization and utilization of supergrade positions throughout the NFIP. Accordingly, the Committee directs that the current authorization of supergrade positions be considered a ceiling pending completion of the review.

(i) The Committee has taken a special interest in what it views as substantial increases in the budgets of several intelligence agencies attributable to their administrative obligations under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and wishes to explore the problems inherent in the